Tuesday, August 26, 2008

Saddam = Sakaashvili?

Another equation, but with logic many have already hinted at. My point here is mostly the idea of regime change---more and more, with the latest comments from Russian generals and Foreign Affairs Department head Sergei Lavrov, it seems Georgia's long-held paranoia has been confirmed: Russia does in fact seem to want Sakaashvili's head, and probably has all along, likely in just as crude a way as Saddam's was shock-deprived of oxygen.

What I sorta wonder is whether or not they actually think the guy's insane, and how much, if they do, that factors into their decisions to overthrow his admittedly slipshod government. And that in turn makes for a bigger, even juicier question: how much of what the Russian bureaucrats are spewing out right now do they actually believe themselves? And what, in each of these instances, are they after? Is Putin so hot-headed that he simply kept rolling with the punches (WTO---out, NATO partnership---out, all negotiating leverage besides that gained by oil and gas---out) after having dealt himself a severe wound by shooting himself in the foot with the escalation in Georgia? And how much is Medvedev turning into his double out of genuine respect for his unabashed railing against anyone who disses them and how much is he being put up to it all by the master puppeteer?

A hilarious example of language so exaggerated it's far beyond absurd, like calling Yeltsin a bit of a drinker:

(from a statement by Foreign Affairs minister Sergei Lavrov yesterday): The president and parliament [etc. etc.] today passed a resolution acknowledging the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and regarding the signing of agreements expressing friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.

Mutual assistance. As in, you let us piss off the Georgians from your territory every once in a while, and we'll try not to let any South Ossetian elementary schools fall into the wrong hands like we did with your Northern brethren, you can tout our military as having your back, and the money will come in steady flows. That is, as long as we still hate Georgia and it's in our interests to have you as our lap dogs.

Saturday, August 23, 2008

Obama + Putin = ?

I just thought of something after reading this solid, well-informed, moderately insightful piece by David Remnick, editor of the New Yorker and former Moscow correspondent for the Washington Post (during the fall of the Soviet Union). In the last sentence, his genuinely thought-provoking conclusion hints at the shortcomings in the diplomatic techniques used by the West in dealing with Putin (and, to a lesser extent, both due to his weakened presence and his seemingly more flexible and reasonable approach toward governance, Medvedev), whose all-encompassing power is extremely dynamic, stretching across boundaries not dared to be traversed by his immediate predecessor at least. He's conniving, aggressive, and has a whole ton of firepower behind him, from military and social (a vast majority of Russians support him) to monetary and natural-resource---which makes him a spiny target for Western handling. That is, Europe can't piss him off too bad because they're so dependent on him for gas supplies, and the U.S. doesn't seem to want to face off with him for, well, lots of reasons, such as the fact that their military is already overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan, they see the idiocy in the Georgian move to attack South Ossetia and therefore for all their support of the maniac Saakashvili they don't wanna take too strong a position against Russia, etc. etc.

Those were all tangents. What I really thought of immediately after finishing Remnick's rumination was how Obama, the possible successor to a largely ineffectual negotiator in Bush, might handle Putin; whether he would be the one negotiating with him at all or whether he might leave it mostly to his secretary of state, much as Bush has done with Rice; or whether he might not dispatch VP Biden, a veteran in foreign affairs, to deal with the temperamental de facto leader of the country.

More than anything else, I just thought about how Putin might react to having to negotiate with Obama. I can't recall reading anything about Putin's opinion of the U.S. presidential candidates or about race---but given his deep-seated Russianness, a characteristic stereotypically (and definitively present in large numbers of Russians) tied to prejudice against anyone who is anything but ethnic Russian or, in some cases, a member of another white people, I can just imagine him trying to hide his discomfort in meeting with Obama. I so want to see that.

Whether or not Obama would himself be any more effective a negotiator or diplomat with Putin, regardless (not that you can simply disregard the influence of Putin's likely unease with the man) of possible personal issues, is a completely different story of course. From what I've seen of Obama, especially lately, I can't say that I have a lot of confidence in his ability to take a hard line---not that that's necessarily the path I think needs to be taken with Putin all the time. But the Russian prime minister is so saavy and has so much experience in having his way with weak-stomached foreign leaders, that I would worry about Obama's ability to stand his ground with him.

There's even a fitting historical analogy that may predict the result of this potential unfair fight. I remember reading about how JFK met with Khrushchev when he first became president and got his ass handed to him by the Soviet head of state. He got completely out-played diplomatically, bullied around by Stalin's experienced successor. There have been worthy comparisons made between JFK and Obama---both young, highly intelligent, charismatic politicians who quickly rose through the political ranks---but I wonder if the latter too might run straight into a brick wall in attempting to negotiate with Russia's newest shrewd, powerful, autocratic leader.

Forever War

I read this article in the latest NYT magazine and found it really compelling. I'd have to think more about the running motif to feel like I understand its exact place or impact in the piece, but I think Filkins does a really good job of setting up the deadness he feels when gets back . . . and communicates the sense of the title of the book this piece is a part of, "The Forever War."